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ABSTRACT
AN EXTENSIONALIST APPROACH TO ONTOLOGICAL COMMITMENT:
WHY QUINE IS MOSTLY RIGHT
by William Felix Suttle III
August 20 11
A criterion of ontological conunitment is a formal method for determining what
objects or entities a themy says exists. The most famous criterion of ontological
commitment was developed by W .V.O. Quine. However, Quine' s criterion has been
attacked for presumably not meeting his own standards for an acceptable theory. After
explaining the motivation and details of Quine ' s criterion, I will tum to the prominent
objections against his tl1e01y. I will argue that there are problems botl1 with Quine's
formulation of his criterion, as well as the interpretation of Quine 's ctiterion as presented
by his objectors. In response to these issues, I will present my own criterion of
ontological commitment. I argue that my criterion of ontological commitment meets
Quine' s standards for an acceptable th eory, but is not subject to the prominent objections
that have been used against his criterion.
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1
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Ontology is concemed with providing a general theory of what smt of things
exist. A related meta-ontological issue is dete1mining to what sort of entities a themy is
committed. To discern the ontological commitments of a theory philosophers employ a
criterion of ontological commitment.
The most famous criterion of ontological commitment was developed by Willard
van Onnan Quine (1908-2000). According to Quine, the ontological commitments of a
themy are those entities the themy requires as values of the bound variables of
quantification. Because the existential quantifier, denoted by '(3x)', is the fonna1
analogue of the ordinary language phrase 'x exists ', first-order predicate logic makes
explicit the ontological commitments of a themy. I will briefly note several points about
Quine's criterion, to be discussed in more detail.
Quine argues that theories presented in ordinary language are ambiguous and for
this reason ordinary language results in problems when disceming the ontological
commitments of a theory. Consider a historically salient example. Philosophers have
argued that the meaningfulness of certain statements containing general predicate terms,
such as ' is red ' and 'is round' implies an ontological commitment to abstract or universal
objects. In fact, it is the ordina1y language that has misled these philosophers. Quine
contends that meaningful statements containing general predicate tem1s such as ' is red '
imply no ontological commitment to such purpmied objects. From a Quinean standpoint,
the reason such statements are not committed to abstract objects is because general
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predicate terms are not the values of the bound variables of quantification when
statements containing those terms are tnnslated into first-order predicate logic.
A significant implication of Quine 's view is. that by making the existence claims
of ordinary language explicit, one can eliminate otherwise problematic ontological
commitments that may be thought to follow from some theories. Tllis is important if one
is committed to nominalism. Consider that mathematics seems to be ontologically
committed to the existence of abstract objects that are "numbers." It seems ·that the
following hue statement, ' There is an even number greater than 1000', implies an
ontological commitment to there being some object that is an even number (which is
surely not a particular concrete object) and this even number has the attribute of being
greater than 1000. However, from the logical standpoint, a good pmtion of mathematics
can be translated i?to set themy. One such theory is as follows. Zero is mapped onto the
empty set, e.g., ' {} ', one is mapped onto the set with its sole element being the empty set,
e.g., ' {{}} ', two is mapped onto the set having as its sole element the set containing the
empty set, e.g., ' {{{}}} ' , and so on. To assert that there is an even number greater than
1000 requires no more than accepting existential quantification over sets. Thus, while
ordinary language seems to imply that mathematics is ontologically comnlitted to an
infinite number of unique abstract objects, via u·anslation into a set themy , one avoids
ontological conunitment to "numbers." Thus, not only is an adequate criterion of
ontological commitment significant for discenling the genuine colillllitments of a themy,
but through formal translation one can avoid othenvise problematic ontological
commitments.
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While Quine's criterion is the standard approach to ontological commitment,
there is some debate regarding its adequacy. Objections to his criterion take three forms.
First, there are objections based on Quine's use of the theoty of definite descriptions in
his criterion. On Quine's view, ordinaty proper names can be logically parsed as definite
descriptions. For example, the ordinary proper name 'Pegasus' can be logically parsed as
the defmite description, 'the imique winged horse that was captured by Bellerophon' .
Quine has sound methodological reasons, to be discussed shmtly, for eliminating
ordinruy proper names from theoretical discourse, but some philosophers ru·gue that the
theory of definite descriptions is a controversial theory and should play no essential role
in a theory of ontological commitment. I will show how Quine can meet this objection.
Second, there ru·e objections based on the adequacy of Quine's criterion in cases
where theories are ontologically committed to some entity but the entity does not in fact
exist. Philosophers who raise this objection ru·gue that in such circmnstances Quine
requires intensional entities to be the values of the existentially bound vru·iables. But
Quine is explicit that intensionality leads to hopeless theoretical confusion and so should
be rejected from clear theoretical discourse. I will argue that intensional entities are not
required for demonstrating the ontological commitments of false theories.
Finally, some philosophers ru·gue that Quine's formulation of his criterion employ
modal notions, especially the.notion of necessity, which Quine himself rejects.
Philosophers who raise this objection argue that not only Quine's fonnulation of his
criterion but any criterion of ontological commitment that is adequate for discetning the
ontological commitments of a theory will employ modal notions. In response to this
argument against Quine 's criterion, I will argue for ru1 interpretation of his criterion that
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requires no modal notions. The overall result is an extensionalist approach to ontological
cmmnitment that avoids the problems of Quine 's criterion and is not subject to the
objections that some philosophers have employed against the notion of an extensionalist
ctiterion of ontological commitment in general.
In Chapter II, I will explain Quine's criterion of ontological commitment in detail,
first concentrating on problems that arise for themies presented in ordinary language and
so ground his motivation for fmmulating a criterion of ontological commitment in firstorder predicate logic. In Chapter III, I will evaluate the arguments against Quine's
criterion, specifically those arguments that purp01t to show that his ctiterion requires
intensional and modal notions. Then I will present and argue for an extensionalist
approach to ontological commitment that avoids these problems.
Before turning to Chapter II, I will state some presuppositions. I will not
presuppose any patticular ontology. Given Quine's commitment to nominalism, it is easy
to assume that Quine 's criterion is itself a kind of a priori argmnent for nominalism. This
is not the case. The pmpose of a critetion of ontological commitment is to infmm us
about what a theory says exists, not tell us what in fact exists. Thus, a guiding principle in
evaluating a critetion of ontological commitment is that it makes no presuppositions
about what there is. It should also be noted that a critetion of ontological conunitment is
only applicable to theories that make claims about what things or smts of things there are.
Another way of stating this is that Quine's criterion is only applicable to those theories
that can be translated into first-order predicate logic. Also, I will not consider conditional
or hypothetical theories of the form: if p is the case, then q is the case. While themies in
conditional fmm may purpmt to tell what would be the case if something else is the case,
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they do not explicitly purpmt to tell what is the case. The theories to which a criterion of
ontological commitment is applicable are those theories that aim to tell in a fundamental
way the sorts of things populate the actual world. Finally, I will presuppose a bivalent
fi:amework regarding the truth-values of statements that make assertions, i.e., such
statements are either tme or false. I now tum to Chapter II.
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CHAPTER II
QUINE' S CRITERION OF ONTOLOGICAL COMMJMENT
Underlying Quine' s criterion of ontological commitment is his claim that ordinaty
language can result in confusions that lead to mistaken ontologies. One exatnple of a
problematic ontology sometimes derived from ordinaty language is the view that
meaningful statements a~·e ontologically committed to referents for gratnmatically proper
names. Another problematic ontology sometimes de1ived from ordinaty language is the
view that the some meat1ingful statements are ontologically committed to non-actual-butpossible entities, i.e., mind-independent entities that do not exist but could exist. I will
explain Quine's views on each in tum. Ultimately, these problems with ordinaty language
motivate Quine's employment of first-order predicate logic for developing his criterion.
Section I: Ordinaty Language atld Ontological Confusions
A non-referential te1m is a tetm that lacks a referent but is meaningful within the
context of a statement - there is no object to which the te1m refers. The proper name,
' Pegasus' is a paradigm example of a non-refening te1m. The view that meaningful
statements containing non-referential terms are ontologically committed to non-existing
objects is an ancient position going back at least to Plato. Quine presents his

a~·gument

against this view as a dispute between himself and a hypothetical opponent he dubs
'McX'. Consider the statement, ' Pegasus does not exist' :
If Pegasus were not, McX argues, we should not be talking about anything
when we use the word; therefore it would be nonsense to say even that
Pegasus is not. Thinking to show thus that the denial of Pegasus cannot be
coherently maintained, he concludes that Pegasus is. (Quine 1961 , 2)
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McX 's argument intends to demonstrate that statements denying the existence of a
pmpmted entity, such as Pegasus, are self-contradictmy. In order to deny the existence of
Pegasus, the statement 'Pegasus does not exist' must be meaningful. The controversial
premise in the argument is the premise that ptupmts that the proper name 'Pegasus' must
refer to something if the statement denying the existence of Pegasus is meaningfuL If the
proper name ' Pegasus' refers to something; it follows that the object referred to by the
proper name 'Pegasus ' exists. Thus, the statement 'Pegasus does not exist' implies the
statement 'There is something that the tenn ' Pegasus ' refers to, and tllis something,
which must exist to be the referential object of the tenn, does not exist' . But that is selfcontradictory. Therefore, Pegasus exists.
Not many philosophers have found this argument convincing. Most people today,
philosophers and non-philosophers alike, believe that Pegasus does not exist. At least we
have no good epistenlic reason to believe that Pegasus exists, and more importantly, most
of us believe that it is meaningful to deny that Pegasus exists.

An immediate objection to McX's argument is that it seems capable of"proving"
the existence of just about anything, e.g., the golden mountain, the flying spaghetti
monster, etc., so long as the te1m referring to the " object" in question is embedded within
the context of a meaningful statement. Someone who believes in non-existent objects
may be inclined to believe in golden mountains and flying spaghetti monsters, but McX's
argument is a bad argun1ent for such objects.
Quine claims that advocates ofMcX's argument concede that there is no flesh and
blood flying horse but that the referent of the term 'Pegasus ' is the idea of Pegasus (196 1,
2). However, whether or not the referent of the te1m ' Pegasus ' is an idea, the statement
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'Pegasus does not exist' does not deny the existence an idea but denies that there exists a
flesh and blood flying horse (Quine 1961, 2). Attempting to prove that the object Pegasus
exists because a statement containing the te1m 'Pegasus' is meaningful is not only a bad
argument to suppott the claim that Pegasus exists, but really is not even an argument for
the existence of Pegasus.
McX ' s mistake is to confuse the meaning of ordinary language statements with
genuine ontological commitments, i.e., confusing words with objects. While some
ordinary language statements might seem ontologically committed to non-existent
objects, to hold such a position is to conflate the meaning of a statement with objects that
may be the referents of terms. Thus, Quine has demonstrated one way in which
ontological confusion might result from ordinruy language.
Another ontological confusion that sometimes arises in philosophical contexts is
the view that the referents of some ordinru·y proper names, such as ' Pegasus,' are
possible-but-non-actual entities, i.e., possibilia. Possibilia are thought to be objects that
may or may not be actual. Possibilia ru·e not considered to be simply ideas or mental
constructs, but real things - although perhaps not things that actually exist. Like the view
conceming non-existent objects, the confusion that leads to positing una.ctualized
possible entities again results from the presupposition that ce1tain tenns embedded in
meaningful statements require referents to accOlmt for the meaning of such statements.
Quine presents this argument against possibilia as a dispute between himself and a
hypothetical opponent he calls ' Wymru1' :
Pegasus, Wyman maintains, has his being as an unactualized possible.
When we say of Pegasus that there is no such thing, we are saying, more
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precisely, that Pegasus does not have the special attribute of actuality.
Saying that Pegasus is not actual is on a par with saying that the Parthenon
is not red; in either case we are saying something about an entity whose
being is unquestioned. (Quine 1961 , 3)
Quine attributes to ' Wyman' the view that that there is a special attribute, "actuality,"
which is ttue of some things and not of others. There is a. philosophical tradition dating
back at least to hnmanuel Kant in the 18th centmy which claims that existence is not an
attlibute. 1 h1 light of this tradition, we are already supposed to find Wyman's position,
based on the analogy between the Pruthenonnot-being-red and Pegasus not-being-actual,
implausible.
Some philosophers of logic have developed fonnal systems that take into account
Wyman's distinction between "actuality" and "being." Quine maintains that the
existential quantifier of first-order logic, denoted by '(3x) ' ru1d read ' for some x' , is the
fmmal analogue of the ordina.Iy language locution 'x exists ', with 'x' being a variable
that takes an object as its value. Thus, the values of the vru·ia.bles bound to the existential
quantifier ru·e objects that exist. Other philosophers, in the spi1it of Wyman, introduce in
addition to the universal quantifier, '(x)' and the existential quantifier, '(3x)', another
fmmal quantifier called a 'particulru·' quantifier, denoted by ' Tix'. ' Tix ' is read 'for some
x ' , but unlike the existential quantifier the variables bound by this pruticular quantifier
take as their values objects that do not exist, and in the case of purpmted non-actual
objects, those objects that do not exist but presumably could exist. Both the existential
and the patticular quantifiers are inte1preted objectually, i.e. , their bound vru·iables take
1
Sometimes this notion is stated as 'existence is not a predicate' . The word 'exists' is a pelfectly
acceptable linguistic predicate. What is intended by such claims is that 'existence' is not an attribute that
some things possess and other things do not.
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objects as their values. Such fmmal systems that distinguish between an existential and a
pa1ticular quantifier are called dual-domain systems because the existential quantifier
ranges over an inner domain of objects that exist, while the pruticular quantifier ranges
over an outer domain of" objects" that do not exist.
Now consider a dual-domain system in light of Wyman' s position. Let 'W' be the
general predicate term ' is a winged horse '. Under the dual-domain view, there is a
hue substitution instance of:
(1)

(Tix) Wx

With '(Tix)' taking as the value of 'x ' the possible-but-non-actual object "Pegasus" from
the outer domain. While ' Pegasus is a winged horse' is not a tme substitution instance of:
(2)

(3x) Wx

' (3x) ' ranges only over the ilmer domain of actually existing objects, and "non-actualbut-possible Pegasus" does not exist. The metaphysics underlying this view is that there
are two distinct ontological categories of objects, those that exist and those that do not
exist but are "possible."
One problem for a dual-domain system is clarifying the distinction between
"actuality" and "being." Beyond the fact that such a distinction seems to unnecessarily
bloat one 's ontology, many philosophers including both Quine and myself, can make no
sense of the distinction. In light of this problem a philosopher such as Wyman could
reject the view that the distinction between actual and so-called "non-actual" objects be
drawn in tetms of the atu·ibute of "actuality'' but nonetheless might claim that the
"possible-but-non-actual Pegasus" lacks au atu·ibute that concrete objects possess. What
Pegasus lacks is not "actuality" but the atu·ibute of spa.tiotemporallocation. Under this
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view, possibilia are simply abstract objects. While such a view inherits the problems that
infect the metaphysics of abstract objects, it is preferable to a dual-domain system
because it does not require an esoteric distinction between things that exist and things that
do not exist. If there are abstract objects, they are actual objects.
Quine's response to \Vyman's position is two-fold. First he attacks the
intelligibility of the notion of non-actual-but-possible objects then he demonstrates that
positing such entities are not required to account for meaningful statements containing
non-refening terms. If the very notion of non-actual objects is unintelligible, then it
makes no sense to posit such "objects" as the referents oftenns. Quine argues that:
Wyman's over populated tmiverse is in many ways unlovely. It offends
the aesthetic sense of us who have a taste for desert landscapes, but this is
not the worst of it. Wyman's slum of possibles is a breeding ground for
disorderly elements. Take, for instance, the possible fat man in that
doo1way. Are they the same possible man, or two possible men? How do
we decide? How many possible men are there in that doorway? Are there
more possible thin ones than fat ones? How many of them are alike? Or
would their being alike make them one ... or finally, is the concept of
identity simply inapplicable to unactualized possibles? But what sense can
be found in talking of entities which cannot meaningfully be said to be
identical with themselves and distinct from another? (1961 , 4)
Aside fi:om viewing these "ontological slums" as unaesthetic, his argument rests on the
cla.in1 that there is no principle of individuation for unactualized possibles. It is not just
that it is a mistake to posit such objects as referents for othe1wise non-refening te1ms, but

12

the idea ofunactualized possibles does not even make sense. In Philosophy ofLogics,
Susan Haack explains: "Criteria of identity give conditions for things of a given kind to
be identical, as: sets are the same if they have the same members, or as: physical objects
are the same if they occupy the same spatio-temporal position" (43). Note that while

specifying identity conditions for individuation seems to be asking for an a priori
criterion, Quine's idea is that it literally makes no sense to say that something exists,
much less is the referent of a te1m, if there is no idea of what it would really be for
individuals of that kind to be distinct from one another.
Haack conectly notes that Quine's crite1ion of identity may be too strong as a
standard for the intelligibility of positing entities. For example, she w1ites that many of us
believe that there are persons, but providing identity conditions for persons is a notmious
philosophical problem (Haack 43). It also seems clear that physical objects easily admit
of individuation, but it is arguable that on the quantum level where the objects of interest
are subatomic pa1ticles, specifying principles of individuation for such subatomic objects
may be much less clear than it is for ordinary eve1yday objects. By Quine's standards, we
might have to reject persons and subatomic objects as ''lmintelligible." Thus, even if we
think of Quine's criteria of individuation as providing a methodological filter for not
allowing some problematic objects into our ontology, his criterion of individuation may
filter too much from our ontology. In defense of Quine on this point, even lacking some
p1inciple of individuation there may be other good reasons to believe that there are
persons and subatomic pa1ticles, while arguably there are no good reasons for believing
that there are unactualized possibles.
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In Dispensing with Possibilia (1976), Ruth Barcan Marcus argues that identity
conditions for unactualized possibles can be specified. Her identity conditions are based
on a possible-worlds interpretation of quantified modal logic. According to the possibleworlds semantics that Marcus employs, the actual world where we exist is represented as
the set of objects that exist in our world. However, according to Marcus there are also
other possible worlds. Unlike standard first-order logic, her quantifiers are mapped not
only onto a domain representing the actual world, but in addition onto domains
representing other possible worlds. We can think of Marcus' view as similar to the dualdomain view above, except instead of there being only two circles representing domains
of discourse, there are an infinite number of circles representing an infinite number of
"possible worlds." However unlike the dual-domain view, Marcus allows her existential
quantifier to range over all domains. Thus, from the Quinean standpoint, the objects that
populate Marcus' possible worlds exist just as the objects that populate the actual world
exist.
Marcus takes possibilia to be the objects that populate these various "possible
worlds." She claims that they are individuated by our stipulating which predicates are
true of those objects in those various possible worlds (Marcus 44). Whether or not "The
possible fat man in the domway is bald," depends on what we say a priori. Likewise, the
identity claim "The possible fat man in the doorway is numerically identical with the
possible bald man in the doorway" depends on what we stipulate a priori. If we say that
all of the predicates that are true of the one are also tlue of the other then they are
numerically the same possible man, otherwise they are not.

14
Marcus ' response to Quine is unsatisfying for several reasons. First, one who is
suspicious regarding una.ctualized possibles will probably be suspicious about possibleworld semantics as an acceptable themy to provide identity conditions for possibilia.
After all, both " non-actual-but-possible-worlds" and "non-actual-but-possible-obj ects"
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are both "non-actual." Marcus ' appeal to possible worlds as an explanation for identity
conditions for non-actual-but-possible entities is circular. She uses unactualized possibles
(possible-worlds) to explain unactualized possibles (non-actual-but-possible objects).
Just as problematic as engaging in circular reasoning is Marcus ' claim that we
stipulate individuation conditions for unactualized possibles. It is one thing to engage in

fictitious discourse where we may "describe" Sherlock Holmes as "the detective in the
deerstalker cap," or Frodo as "the hobbit who canies the ting to Mordor." It is another
thing altogether to admit, based merely on a cetta.in fonn of discomse, a "non-actual-butpossible Sherlock Holmes" into our ontology. Descriptions are linguistic items, entities
are not. Marcus is confusing words with objects.
Quine's concem is with theories that take non-actual-but-possible entities to be
the objects of reference for cetiain grammatically proper names. On one hand, if Hobbits
are fictional entities then Hobbits are mind-dependent fictions. They are on par with
ideas, and like "the idea of Pegasus," are not the focus of Quine 's argmnent. On the other
hand, if possible-but-non-actual Hobbits are not mind-dependent fictions, then no sense
can be made of the notion that a priori stipulated desctiptions substantially create such
objects. It is not our a priori descriptions of individuals that make those descriptions
refer, but the fact that individuals are cettain ways that make the descriptions refer.
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The lack of a clear crite1ion of individuation is only one aspect of Quine's
argument against unactualized possibles. An equally impmtant aspect of Quine's
argument is that non-actual-but-possible objects are not required in order to understand
statements containing non-refening te1ms. Demonstrating this is sufficient to show that
such statements are not ontological~y committed to unactualized possibles. Like McX and
Marcus, Wyman's fundamental mistake is to confuse the grammatically proper name
'Pegasus ' with an alleged object that is supposed to be the referent of the proper name
'Pegasus' (Quine 1961 , 9). However, at least since the work ofGottlob Frege, analytic
philosophers have been sensitive to the distinction between meaning and reference. 2
Consider the statement, 'The Morning Star is the Evening Star. ' The singular tenns
'Moming Star' and 'Evening Star' refer to the same planet Venus. However, 'Morning
Star' and 'Evening Star' have different meanings. Thus, meaning is not equivalent to
reference.
Once this distinction between words and objects is recognized and obse1ved, the
arguments from meaningful statements for both non-existent objects and for possibilia
are dispelled. Of course, this does not entail that there are no such objects, but it does
demonstrate that making meaningfi.1l statements about non-existent objects is not
committed to the existence of non-existent objects or unactualized possibles. In fact,
Quine argues that because ordinruy proper nrunes can be elim inated fi:om theoretical
discourse in favor of definite descriptions, ordinruy proper names (refening or not) cany
no ontological commitments . Quine employs Bertrand Russell 's themy of defmite
descriptions to elilninate ordinru·y proper names from theoretical discourse. 3 The themy

2

3

For Frege's classic piece on meaning and reference, see Gottlob Frege (1980).
For Russell's theory of definite descriptions, see Bertrand Russell (1905). ·
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of definite descriptions maintains that granunatically proper names can be logically
analyzed as definite descriptions of the fonn 'the so and so.' For example, a proper name
like ' Pegasus' can be logically parsed as a defmite description of the fonn, 'There is at
least and at most one winged horse who was captured by Bellerophon, and whoever is the
winged horse that was captured by Bellerophon is identical to Pegasus ' (Quine 1961 , 7).
Two impm1ant feah1res of a definite description are its existence condition and its
uniqueness condition. Consider the formalization in first-order predicate logic of the
proper name 'Pegasus' in tenns of a defmite description:
(3)

( 3x) [Wx & (y)(Wy :J (x = y)) & Cxb]

We read this as, ' There is an x, xis a winged horse, and given any y, xis identical toy
and x is captured by Bellerophon.' Quine tmderstands the pln·ase 'there is at least one' in
tenns of the objectual interpretation of the existential quantifier of first-order predicate
logic, i.e., to say 'there is at least one x' is to say 'x exists.' After an ordinruy proper
name is logically parsed as a definite description, ordinruy proper names (whether
referring or not) ru·e eliminated in such a way that the variables of quantification cany the
ontological conunitments of statements which contain them. The statement ' Pegasus
exists ' is hue if and only if the existence condition of the above definite description is
satisfied, i.e. , if and only if there exists some unique object that is the value of the bow1d
variable x, and this object is the winged horse that was captured by Bellerophon.
Impmtantly, conn·ary to views like those ofMcX and Wyman, making statements
denying that Pegasus exists does not commit one to the existence of Pegasus; it is just to
deny that the existence condition of a definite desctiption is satisfied.
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One might object to Quine's eliminating ordinary proper names in favor of
defmite descriptions because a definite description for a grammatically proper name
(refening or not) may not always be fotthcoming. It is also the case that defmite
descriptions will vruy from person to person, and so they depend on what persons
understand by the proper nrunes in question. For example, for many people the definite
description pru·sing the proper nrune 'Aristotle' might simply be 'the Greek philosopher,'
which is a definite description that is (was) satisfied by many individuals. For definite
descriptions to do the work that Quine requires, i.e., allowing one to eliminate ordina1y
proper names, it is required that the defmite description in question unambiguously and
uniquely pick out a referent falling tmder the description, if there is a referent.
Quine solves this problem by substituting a unique predicate in place of definite
descriptions when such descriptions might raise problems. He writes:
In order thus to subswne a one-word nrune or alleged name such as

'Pegasus' under Russell 's theoty of descriptions, we must, of comse, be
able first to translate the word into a description. But tbis is no real
resuiction. If the notion of Pegasus had been so obscme or so basic a one
that no pat u·anslation into a descriptive phrase had offered itself along
familiru· lines, we could still have availed ow-selves of the following
a1tificial and trivial-seeming device: we could have appealed to the e,x
hypothesi unanalyzable, ineducible attribute of being Pegasus, adopting,
for its expression, the verb ' is-Pegasus', or 'pegasizes'. The noun
'Pegasus' itself could then be u·eated as derivative, and identified after all
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with a description: 'the thing that is-Pegasus', 'the thing that pegasizes ' .
(1961 , 7-8)
These predicates se1ve the same purpose as a definite description, namely, to uniquely
identify an individual ifthere is an individual that is the value of the variable within the
extension of the relevant predicates. Thus, in the place of the ordinary proper name
'Pegasus', Quine employs the predicate 'the individual that pegasizes ' to uniquely pick
out the object Pegasus, if Pegasus exists. While one lnight think it counter-intuitive to
employ predicates in this way, the method works from a fmmal and pragmatic standpoint
and that is sufficient for Quine's pmpose. His unique predicates allow one to eliminate
ordinary proper names fiom theoretical discourse, in tum allowing one to avoid problems
that might arise fi·om ordinary proper names and definite descriptions. By eliminating
ordinru·y proper names we have also shifted the issue of ontological commitment away
fi·om ordinmy proper names, which adlnit of vagueness regarding reference, and onto the
vm·iables of quantification. To deny that Pegasus exists is to say that there is no unique

individual that satisfies the following statement: 'there is an x that pegasizes ' . More
formally, to deny that Pegasus exists is to affmn a statement from the following
schematic formula.:' - (3x) Px', or by quantifier negation: ' (x) - Px ', to be read,
'everything in the universe is such that it does not have the unique attribute of
pegasizing'. Therefore, the meaningfhlness of statements containing the proper name
'Pegasus ' do not imply ontological commitments.
One might also argue against Quine's account because it has the consequence that
all statements containing non-refening proper names ru·e false. 4 This consequence
follows from the fact that defmite descriptions require the existence and uniqueness of
4

See for example, Stephen Read (1995). ·
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their referent in order for the statement containing them to be true. If the existence
condition of a defmite description is not satisfied, i.e., there is no object to be the value of
the existentially botmd vruiable when the definite description is translated into first-order
predicate logic, the statement containing the defmite desc1iption is false. But there seems
to be a sense in which when I utter the statement 'Pegasus is a winged-horse', I
sometimes utter a tme statement a11d when I utter 'Pegasus is a mechanical owl ', I say
something false. While sometimes an existence condition must be satisfied for a
statement to be tiue, there seem to be tiue statements that not only do not require an
existence condition to be fulfilled but do not even imply that an existence condition is
relevant for their tiuth. If I say 'Pegasus is a winged-horse', and someone replies, 'That is
false, othe1wise, where is this winged-horse you speak of? ' It is cleru· that in some
ordinary circumstances my interlocutor has misunderstood my utterance.
Quine responds by conceding that, in a loose sense, there ru·e circumstances in
which our talk about mythological creatures and fictional stories might be true. For
example, in "Logic and the Reification of Universals," Quine refers to fictional talk as
taking an "attitude of frivolity," to be distinguished from the non-frivolous ente1prise of
natural science (196 1, 103). Unless one believes that there is a flesh and blood flying
horse, what one really means is, ' According to a pru·ticulru· fictional stmy , Pegasus is a
winged-horse '. That statement is true, but its tiuth does not depend on there being an
object that is Pegasus. When our concern is with the ontological commitments of a
theory, our concern is not with what is tiue according to myth, fiction, etc., but with what
a theory genuinely says that there is. What a themy says exists is made explicit by the
range of the themy's bound vmiables. In other words, when disceming ontological
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commitments, our focus is on theories that make claims about the actual world via
employment of the existential quantifier. Thus, we can concede that statements of fiction
are sometimes true, but I will follow Quine in holding that when our concem is with the
ontological conunitments of theories, such statements are in fact false.
I will make a final point regarding Quine's approach to eliminating ordinary
proper names in favor of definite descriptions. There is considerable controversy between
proponents of the theo1y of definite descriptions and proponents of the causal theory of
reference. According to the descriptional themy of reference, proper names refer to
objects via the descriptive content of definite descriptions. Advocates of the causal theory
of reference contend that proper names, when they refer, are not mediated through the
descriptive content of descriptions but directly "tag" referents. On the causal theory of
reference, ordinruy proper names ru·e meaningless "name-tags." It has been ru·gued, for
example, by Jaakko Hintikka, that Quine' s crite1ion of ontological commitment is
problematic because it presupposes that the descriptional themy of reference is the
cmTect theory of reference and a criterion of ontological commitment should not
presuppose such a controversial view as the descriptional theory of reference (Hintikka
128). But this is a controversial reading of Quine 's position. Quine need not maintain that
definite descriptions are the meaning of proper names. In fact, his position is consistent
witl1 the view that such ordinary proper names ru·e meaningless. All Quine requires is that
from a logical point of view ordinru·y proper nrunes can be parsed as defmite descriptions
and this is the case, inespective of whetl1er such descriptions ru·e taken to be the meaning
of those proper names.
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To SUllllllarize, Quine claims that ambiguity in ordinmy la11guage causes problems
when disce1ning the ontological commitments of a themy. It is a mistake to think that
ontological commitments result from the meaningfulness of statements. Such views
confuse language with objects. The source of this confusion is the view that
grmnmatically proper names require referents in meaningful statements. As a

methodological procedure towards sema11tic clarity Quine demonstrates that we can
eliminate ordinary proper names in favor of definite descriptions. The result is a shift
away from problematic issues of reference regarding ordinar·y proper names to the bound
var·iables of quantification. From the va11tage point of ordinary language, it is lmclear·
when statements, and thus theories couched in ordinaty language, ar·e in fact
ontologically committed to some purported entities. First-order predicate logic makes
explicit the ontological commitments of a theory. I will now turn to Quine's view
regm·ding when a themy is in fact ontologically committed to some sort of entity - his
criterion of ontological commitment.
Section II: First-Order Predicate Logic and Ontological Commitment
Quine argues that his criterion of ontological commitment is a clear· fmmal
method for explicitly dete1mining the ontological commitments of a themy. Applying his
c1iterion consists in translating a theory into standard first-order predicate logic and then
dete1mining what objects are required to be the values of the existentially qum1tified
bound variables. It is to the values of the bound vmiables that the themy is ontologically
committed. Before evaluating Quine 's criterion, I will digress to say a few words about
first-order predicate logic. This is impmtant because there are va1ious interpretations of
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the vocabulary of standard first-order predicate logic and it would be capricious to
assume persons have the same inteqxetations in mind.
All logical systems consist of a syntax and a semantics. The syntax is a string or
set ofuninte1preted symbols ('symbols' in the sense that they may mean something but
they need not have any meaning). Of course, in choosing symbols, we often have some
pmpose in mind regarding the eventual meaning of those symbols. 5 In the case of
predicate logic the pmpose will be to represent logical relationships between statements
and specifically, sets of statements called argmnents. The characterizing feature of
predicate logic is that we can represent the logical relationships between statements by
taking their "internal" structme into account. Unlike sentential (or "propositional") logic,
which represents relationships between statements as a whole, predicate logic takes into
accom1t both the subject and predicate of statements in evaluating logical relationships.
Thus, in many ways first-order predicate logic is a more inclusive and more powerful
system than sentential logic; and to the extent that we think of language as coiTesponding
to facts , fust-order predicate logic is a powerful tool for evaluating the logical cogency of
theories.
Standard (sometimes called "classical") first-order predicate logic incorporates,
along with the syntax and semantics of sentential logic, the following (with some
deviations). (a) A set of variables denoted by alphabetic letters towards the end of the

5

The formal syntax of predicate logic (and all logics) are simply token marks with certain shapes,
e.g., 'a ' is not the 'a ' of the English alphabet, or any other meaningful symbol for that matter. It is just a
mark that has the same shape as the alphabetic letter 'a '. When developing the fonnal syntax, I refer to
ce1tain shapes as 'constants', ' variables' , etc. However, when I am doing so. I am refeni.ng to them using
the meta-language, that is, I am talking about the language of predicate logic. not using the language of
predicate logic itself. For ease of reading, I anticipate the intended interpretation of the various shapes.
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alphabet, e.g. ' x ', 'y', 'z'; (b) A set of constants denoted by alphabetic letters towards
the beginning of the alphabet, ' a', 'b ', ' c ', etc. ; (c) A set of general predicate te1ms
denoted by upper case alphabetic letters, ' P' , 'H ', 'T', etc; 7 (d) The following logical
constants, 'v' ([inclusive] disjunction), and

'~ '

(negation); (e) The following grammatical

inscriptions, '(', ')', and finally; (f) the existential quantifier, ' 3 '. 8
The universal quantifier, '(x)', sometimes symbolized ' ('v'x) ' , is defined in te1ms
of the existential quantifier: '(x)' = of
'&'(conjunction),

' :J '

'~

(3) ~ x' , and the remaining logical constants,

(mate1ial implication), and' := ', (material equivalence, or the "bi-

conditional") are defmed in te1ms of the primitive logical connectives, 'v'

and'~'.

The

existential and universal quantifiers range over a non-empty domain, or set, of objects.
These objects are the values of the vruiables of quantification. Thus, the quantifiers tell us
9

how many objects from the domain are being denoted. The constants se1ve as names for
specific objects in the domain, and so may be substituted for botmd variables in
quantified formulae. Finally, a quantified fonnula renders a hue statement if and only if it
is the case that there is a statement which is the substitution instance of the quantified
formula in question.
With my interpretation of predicate logic in hand, I now tum to Quine's theory of
ontological commitment. We have seen that ordinary language, and especially ordinary
6

All variables, collStants, and predicates may contain numerical superscripts , i.e. ' a 1 ' , 'a2 ' , etc.,
allowing for our vocabulaty to be countably infinite, if necessary.
7
Sometimes (especially in introductoty texts), general predicate terms are interpreted as denoting
properties or attributes. I interpret general predicate terms as denoting the set of objects for which that
general linguistic predicate it tme. At least one good reason for not interpreting general predicate terms as
denoting propet1ies is because doing so might suggest that there are conjunctive and disjunctive propetties,
which is a controversial view even among fhends of properties as abstract objects. See David ArfllStrong
( 1989), especially Chapter V.
8
While I take 'v'. '-'. and ' 3 ' as prinlitives, and define my vocabulruy in tenus of these. one may
choose other prinlitives. The end result is the same.
9
Technically. formal quantifiers ru·e really "functiollS" that take objects in a domain as their
argument places (the variables) and produce as output statements.
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proper names, can lead to philosophical problems when attempting to discern the
ontological commitments of statements and theories. 10 In response to these problems,
Quine presents a fonna1 criterion for detennining the genuine ontological commitments
of a theory. In On What There Is, he writes, "A theory is committed to those and only
those entities to which the bound variables of the themy must be capable of referring in
order that the affirmations made in the themy be tJue" (Quine 1961 , 13-14). Once a
statement of a themy is translated into standard first-order predicate logic, one looks to
the bound variables of quantification for that statement's ontological commitJnents. 11 A
themy is ontologically committed to those pmported objects that are required as values of
the bound variables of the themy in order for statements in that themy to be tJue.
Consider a few of Quine's examples employing his criterion of ontological commitment.
Quine writes:
We may say, for example, that some dogs are white and not thereby
commit ourselves to recognizing either doghood or whiteness as entities.
'Some dogs are white ' says that some things that are dogs are white, and
in order that this statement be tJue, the things over which the bound
variable 'something' ranges must include some white dogs, but need not
include doghood or whiteness. (1961 , 13)

°

1

For clarification, on Quine's view, it is not persons that are ontologically conunitted, but
theories. While this may seem unintuitive at first, when we consider that a person can be mistaken about
the ontological commitments of a theory that she accepts, the idea of theories being ontologically
committed seems plausible.
11
In particular, we look to the bound variables of the existential quantifier. One might object on
gretmds that the existential quantifier is definable in tenus of the universal quantifier and that the universal
quantifier often may not cany ontological commitment, e.g., mliversally quantified statements are trivially
tme in a (logical) universe where no objects exist. Om focus when developing a criterion of ontological
commitment is its applicability to theories that make claims about the actual world, and so any theory
translated into first-order predicate logic that canies an ontological conunitment in virtue of the existential
quantifier will also cany an ontological commitment when the existential quantifier, by quantifier negation.
is read in terms of the universal quantifier.
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Quine's view is that the statement ' Some dogs are white' is ontologically committed to at
least one white dog in virtue of the fact that at least one white dog is required as the value
of the existentially bound variable. Consider a translation of ' Some dogs are white' in
first-order predicate logic:
(4)

(3x) (Dx & Wx)

A universe where there are no white dogs is a universe where ' Some dogs are white' is
false. TI1e truth of the statement 'Some dogs are white' depends on there being at least
one white dog and the quantification f01m of this statement makes its commitment
explicit. Notice that our criterion of ontological commitment can make explicit the
ontological commitments of (4) without presupposing any ontology. However, under
Quine's view, (4) is not committed to there being an entity that is 'whiteness', as the
general predicate tenn 'white ' is not bound by an existential quantifier. Only the object
that is the value of the variable 'x' is bound to the existential quantifier.
Consider an example offered by Quine that canies an ontological commitment to
abstract objects. He w1ites:
When we say that some zoological species are cross-fe1tile we are
committing ourselves to recognizing as entities the several species
themselves, abstract though they are. We remain so committed at least
until we devise some way of so paraphrasing the statement as to show that
the seeming reference to species on the pa1t of our botmd variable was an
avoidable manner of speaking. (1961 , 13)
Consider the statement 'Some zoological species are cross-fe1tile' , translated into firstorder predicate logic:
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(5)

(3x) (Zx & Cx)

Just as there must be at least one thing that is a white dog for our previous example to be
true, here, there must be at least one value of the bound variable 'x ' that is a cross-fe1iile
zoological species. However, many of us do not usually think of the term 'species' as
denoting concrete individuals (while of course, the members of the species are concrete
individuals)Y Thus , this statement under Quine's theory of ontological commitment is
committed to the existence of abstract objects, in this case, a "zoological species," as
such an object is required as the value of the existentially bound variable.
An impmtant aspect of Quine ' s fonnal criterion of ontological commitment is that

it not only demonstrates what a theory says exists but it also provides an explicit formal
method for determining when a themy is not committed to some purported entities. We
have seen this aheady where Quine demonstrates that ordina1y proper names within the
context of meaningful statements are not ontologically committed to referents.
Fmthermore, in the above examples, we see that the employment of general predicates
terms in first-order logic do not carry ontological commitments. It is impmtant to keep in
mind that for Quine the ontological commitments of a theory are what a the01y says there
is, not what there is. Thus, our criterion of ontological commitment is applicable to any

themy as an imprutial standard that can applied to theories independently of whether the
themy that the criterion is applied to is conect or not. A nominalist may ve1y well be
interested in showing that a pruticular tl1e01Y is committed to Platonism without him or
herself accepting the themy as conect.
12 Some philosophers of biology, see er;pecially David Hull (1 976) argue that species are concrete
individuals, with the members of those species being temporal parts of the scattered object that is the
individual concrete spec.ies. Setting aside the cogency of this view, we simply note that one who accepts
this view should, under Quine's view, have no problem quantifying over species (although one may
disagree with Quine conceming the natme of what it is that one is quantifying over).
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I have explained Quine 's criterion of ontological commitment. I will now turn to a
central objection to Quine's criterion, namely, that his criterion cannot be formulated in a
way that is both adequate as a general method for discerning the commitments of a theory
but also meet his own standards for the intelligibility of a themy.
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CHAPTER III
EXTENSIONALITY AND ONTOLOGICAL COMMITMENT
A prominent objection in the literature against Quine's criterion of ontological
commitment is that it seems to employ intensional notions, and in pa1iicular, modal
notions. A modal context is a statement that incorporates the notions of possibility or
necessity. The truth-values of statements in intensional contexts are not truth-fi.mctional,
that is they depend for their truth on factors other than the truth-values of the nonintensional components of those statements. For example, the statement 'There are eight
planets in our solar system' is true or false relative only to the number of planets in our
solar system. Such a statement is said to be a statement in an extensional context. By
contrast, the truth or falsity of the statement 'Necessarily, there are eight planets in our
solar system' depend on factors other than the number of planets that populate our solar
system, e.g., what sort of 'necessity' one is talking about, in what sense might the solar
system had been different, etc. 13 According to Quine's own standards of theoretical
clarity, intensional notions are ambiguous and so are not suitable for clear discourse. If
Quine's criterion cannot be fmmulated in a way that does not employ intensional notions
then his criterion is just as problematic as the other theories that he rejects on intensional
grounds. 14 While there are several philosophers who argue that Quine 's criterion cannot
be adequately formulated in a non-intensional way, I will concentrate on Michael
Jubian's The Intensionality of Ontological Commitment. 15 Given Jubian's argmnents

13
Inespective of whether there are eight planets in our solar system, some people are inclined to
believe that our universe could have been otherwise, such that there might have been ten planets or even no
planets: and so however many planets there actually are, they believe that it is not necessarily the case that
there are this actual number of planets.
14
Quine rejects propositions (as "meanings" of statements), non-logical modalities, and all
abstract objects other than sets, on intensional grmmds.
15
For example, Richard Cartwright (1954) argues for a similru· conclusion.
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against Quine's criterion, as well as problems with Quine' s own way offonnulating his
criterion, I will defend an interpretation of his criterion that is extensional and is not
subject to Jubian's objections. First I will explain the distinction between intensional and .
extensional contexts since this distinction is central to the objections against Quine's
criterion.
Section I: Extensionality and Intensionality
The extension of a te1m is the set of objects to which the te1m refers . For example,
the extension of the term ' dog' consists of the set of particular dogs that presently exist.
Some te1ms, such as ' God' , may have only a single object in its extension, while some
te1ms, such as 'Pegasus', have no extension, or an empty extension. The truth-value of a
statement in an extensional context depends on the objects in the extension of the te1ms
that comprise the statement. For example, the statement, 'All dogs are canines' is a
statement in an extensional context: its tmth-value depends only on the extension of the
te1m ' dog' and the fact that the general predicate te1m 'is a canine' is true of all objects
that are dogs.
Statements in intensional contexts depend for their truth-value on factors other
than the objects refened to by the tetms that comprise the statement. These other factors
might be related to what one believes, what one knows, what might be the case, etc. In
pa1ticular the truth-value of statements in intensional contexts depends on the meanings
of the statements in question. A test to determine whether a statement is extensional is
whether the statement satisfies substitutivity salva veritate for co-extensional te1ms.
'Salva veritate' is Latin for 'Prese1ving the truth'. Non-logical tenns, 'x' and 'y' are
substitutable sa Iva veritate in a statement if and only if substituting 'x' for 'y', or vice
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versa, is logically guaranteed to not alter the tmtb-value of the statement in which they
are substituted. For example, consider the following statements in an epistemic context:
Lois Lane knows that Supetman is a hero,
and
Lois Lane A:n ows that Clark Kent is a hero.
The first statement is tme (in the fictional story of "Supetman"), while the latter is false.
However, the terms 'Superman ' and 'Clark Kent' have the same extension- the object
that is Superman/Clark Kent. The truth-values of these statements, which contain the
epistemic notion 'knows that' depends on factors other than the extension of the tenns
'Clark Kent' and ' Superman' . The context of the statements above containing the 'knows
that' operator is not extensional because the substitution of the term ' Supennan' with the
co-extensional tenn 'Clark Kent' is not logically guaranteed to preserve the tmth-value of
those statements. Thus, epistemic contexts are considered to be intensional contexts.
It is important from Quine's standpoint that his criterion of ontological

commitment be extensional, since he claims that intensional contexts are at best
ambiguous and at worst, such as he argues regarding quantified modal logic,
unintelligible. Quine has several reasons for claiming that intensional contexts are
problematic. One reason, as we have ah·eady seen, is because identity conditions for
intensional entities are problematic. Another reason he views intensional contexts as
problematic is because intensional contexts depend on meaning for their tmth. He argues
in his Two Dogmas ofEmpiricisrn ( 1961 ), no non-circular account of the concept of
meaning can be provided and so the vety notion of meaning itself is at best ambiguous.
To say that two statements have the same meaning is to say that they are synonymous.
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But to say that two statements are synonymous is just to say that they have the same
meaning. Independent of the extensional ctiterion of substitution salvo veritate, there is
no test for detetmining whether two statements have the same meaning. The ptimary
objection in the literature to Quine ' s criterion of ontological commitment is that any
adequate ctiterion of ontological commitment, including his own, will include some
intensional notions and therefore will fail by his own standards of clarity.
Consider several passages where Quine presents his ctiterion of ontological
commitment; I note in italics the language he uses that seems to employ intensional
contexts. In his Ontology and Ideology, he wtites:
The ontology to which an (interpreted) themy is committed comprises aU
and only the objects over which the bound variables of the theory have to
be construed as ranging in order that the statements affirmed in the themy
be true. (Quine 1951 , 11)
In On What There Is, he wtites, "A themy is committed to those and only those entities to
which the bound variables of the theory must be capable of refetTing in order that the
affmnations made in the themy be true" (Quine 1961 , 13-14) Finally, he wt·ites in
Existence and Quantification (1971):
Another way of saying what objects a themy requires is to say that they are the
objects that some of the predicates of the themy have to be tme of, in order for the
themy to be true. But this is the same as saying that they are the objects that have
to be values of the variables in order for the themy to be tlue. (95)
These fonnulations employ phrases like ' have to be' and 'must be ', which are usually
considered to be intensional locutions. Given Quine 's reservations regarding intensional
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contexts, fi:om his vantage point it is serious problem for his criterion if it cannot be
formulated in an unambiguously extensional way. After all, the very point of his criterion
is to provide a clear method for dete1mining the existence claims of a theo1y, and for
Quine intensional contexts are paradigm ambiguous contexts. I will now critically
evaluate Jubian' s objection to Quine' s criterion.
Section ll: Jubian' s Arguments and My Criterion of Ontological Commitment

In his The lntensionality of Ontological Commitment (1972), Michael Jubian
argues that any adequate characterization of Quine's criterion of ontological commitment
requires intensional notions. An adequate C1ite1ion of ontological commitment is one that
successfully demonstrates what a particular themy says exists. As Jubian notes, there is
no problem providing an extensionalist crite1ion of ontological commitment to theo1ies
that are committed to entities that actually exist. He claims the problem for Quine, and in
general for any extensionalist, is the adequacy of a c1iterion of ontological commitment
regarding themies that are committed to some purpmted entity and that entity does not
exist. After all, a criterion of ontological commitment should be able to demonstrate not
only the ontological commitments of tme theories, but the ontological commitments of
any theo1y. One reason that a philosopher might reject a themy is because of its
ontological commitments. For example, a crite1ion of ontological commitment should be
able to demonstmte that the themy of vitalism is ontologically committed to an elan vital,
even though there is no elan vital. Jubian claims that a c1iterion of ontological
commitment cannot do tllis without incorporating intensional notions. I will argue that
Jubian is mistaken.
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According to Jubian, Quine's ctiterion of ontological commitment expresses a
binaty relation between a theory and that to which a theory is ontologically committed
{Jubien 357). The problem of intensionality arises when one asks: to what exactly is it
that theories bear the relation of ontological commitment? There is no problem for the
extensionalist regarding tiue theories, as there is an object to stand in relation to the
themy regarding that themy's ontological commitments. According to Jubian 's
interpretation of Quine, this relational reading consists of a theory assuming the existence
of some entity. To say that a theory is ontologically committed to some entity is to say
that the themy assumes the existence of that entity. For example, quantum physics is
ontologically committed to electrons if quantum physics assumes that there are electrons.
Presupposing Quine's notion that to be is to be the value of a bound variable, Jubian
coiTectly notes that we rule out the following logical characterization of Quine's
ctiterion:
(6)

(3x) (T assumes x)

We read (6) as ' There is an x, T assumes x' , where' T' is a theory and 'x' is a variable
expressing T's ontological commitments (Jubien 357). While (6) adequately charactetizes
Quine's view that the ontological connnitinents of a themy are the values of the bmmd
variables of quantification, (6) is only if Tis ontologically committed to an entity that
actually exists. To show that (6) is inadequate in circumstances where the ontological
commitments of a theory fail to exist, consider the themy of vitalism. The themy of
vitalism claimed that there is an elan vital, i.e., a "life-force." Thus, under (6) we have,
'There is an x (the value of which is the elan vital), and vitalism assumes x'. Of course,
while vitalism assumed that there is an elan vital, there is no obj ect to be the value of the
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variable bound to the existential quantifier under the vitalism themy. On the objectual
interpretation of the quantifiers in standard first-order logic, to which Quine is
committed, a theory assessed under fonnulation (6) could not be ontologically committed
to a prupmted entity and that entity fail to exist (Jubien 357). Clearly, a themy can be
ontologically committed to the existence of an entity and yet that assumed entity to which
the theory is cmmnitted fails to exist.
One approach to ontological commitment when dealing with theories that are
ontologically committed to an entity but that entity does not exist is to distinguish
between those constants that have referents and those that do not in one's formal system.
Such logical systems are called free logics. In free logic, only those constants that have
referents are legitimate candidates for existential generalization. Consider existential
generalization in standard first-order predicate logic:
(7)

Fa

--7

(3x) Fx

Existential Generalization (EG)

In standard first-order predicate logic, EGis valid only on the condition that the constant
denotes an object in the domain of discomse (for om pmposes, the domain is the actual
universe). Because staudard first-order predicate logic does not allow non-refening
constants, EG is unrestricted and thus always a valid inference within the system.
However, because free logics allow non-referring tenns, existential generalization is only
conditional~y

valid; EGis valid only on the condition that the constant being generalized

on has a referent. Free logics incorporate an existence predicate 'E! ' to make fonnally
explicit that a particular constant has a referent. Free logic pe1mits a revised version of
EG:
(8)

Fa, E!a --7 (3x) Fx

Free Logic Existential Generalization (PEG)
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Under (8), that there is an elan vital does not logically follow from the hue statement
'Vitalism assumes that there is an elan vital ', as FEG is not pennitted on that statement FEG is permitted only on statements containing te1ms that genuinely refer. Thus, a free
logic fmmulation of a criterion of ontological commitment does not have the drawback of
presupposing that Ts ontological commitments actually exist.
However, a free logic fmmulation of a criterion of ontological commitment is not
acceptable for an extensionalist. To extend classical first-order predicate logic to allow
for non-refening te1ms introduces intensionality into fo1mallogic. After all, if a te1m
does not refer, then a fortior; it cannot be used in an extensional context. To extend
standard first-order predicate logic in favor of free logic would unde1mine Quine's
extensionalist motivation for employing standard first-order predicate logic in the first
place.
In response to the problem raised by a free logic interpretation, one can maintain
that a themy's ontological commitments are to classes or sets. A set is simply a collection
of objects. Consider for example quantmn physics, which assume for the sake of
argument, is ontologically committed to the existence of electrons. Under a set-theoretic
inte1pretation of ontological commitment, quantum physics is cmmnitted to the set of
electrons, and in particular, committed to the set of electrons not being the empty set. To
the extent that quantum physics is correct, the set of electrons is a non-empty set with
electrons as members. When a theory is conunitted to the existence of some entity, but
that "entity" does not exist, the 'x ' in 'T assmnes x ' denotes the empty set.
This set-theoretic interpretation of Quine's criterion is both extensional and
furthe1more raises no problems for char·acterizing the ontological commitments of
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theories that are committed to some purported object and yet that object fails to exist.
Because the existentially bOlmd variables of fa lse theories denote the empty set, no
intensional entities or non-refening te1ms are required, as sets provide paradigmatic
extensional contexts. However, Jubian claims that a problem for a set-theoretic
characterization of ontological commitment is that all theories for which there fail to be
an object corresponding to their commitments ultimately have the same ontological
commitment - namely, to the empty set (359). Thus, according to Jubian, under a settheoretic characterization of a criterion of ontological commitment, if 'Pegasus' and
'Count Dracula' denote the empty set, we nonetheless require intensionality because we
require an understanding of the meaning of statements containing the tenns ' Pegasus ' and
'Cotmt Dracula' in order to distinguish between the ontological commitments of different
statements containing those tenns.
There are at least two problems with Jubian's objection to the set-theoretic
inte1pretation. The first problem is that he shifts the issue of ontological commitment
away from the bound variables of quantification, and to what one understands by a
pruticular the01y. Jubian is con·ect that we do not understand a statement asserting the
existence of Count Dracula and a statement asserting the existence of Pegasus to have the
same ontological commitments; surely a child can be an advocate of the one theory and
yet not the other. However, Quine 's criterion is a methodological tool. As such, his
criterion itself is not concerned with what one believes or understands concerning the
nature of the objects asseiied to exist in a particulru· ontology. Quine's goal is to give an
extensional method that can be applied to theories as a way of detetmining what objects,
if any, the the01y requires in order for the theory to be true. A statement asserting that
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Dracula exists and a statement asserting that Pegasus exists require different objects in
order to be t:Iue, but from the extensional point of view, both are false for the same
reason, there is no object in either case to be the value of the variables bound by the
existential quantifier. There is no problem with stipulating that in false statements that
assert the existence Pegasus and Cmmt Dracula, that the names 'Pegasus' and 'Count
Dracula' or their defmite descriptions, denote the empty set, while nonetheless
recognizing that such statements require different non-empty e..:-ctensions for their truth.
Such statements are simply false in virtue of their bound variables taking the empty set as
their values, while requiring non-empty extensions to be t:Iue. What one understands by a
statement or themy is inelevant to determining the ontological commit:Inents of the
statement or themy in question.
Another problem with Jubian's objection to the set-theoretical interpretation is
that he presupposes that proper names, such as 'Pegasus', cany the ontological weight of
statements. Quine eliminates ordinary proper names in favor of definite desctiptions for
the very reason that they cause problems for detennining the genuine ontological
commit:Inents of theories. Once proper names are eliminated fi:om theoretical discourse in
favor of defmite descriptions, and in pmticular in favor of Quine's unique descriptive
predicates, the values of the existentially bound variables detennine the ontological
commit:Inents of a theory. The result is that there is no intensional problem with
stipulating that in the false statement 'there is m1 x that pegasizes' the predicate
'pegasizes' denotes the empty set, m1d noting that the definite description requires a nonempty extension for a statement that it is embedded in to be tme. Whatever may be

38
understood by the predicate 'pegasizes' is an issue for the object-language ontology that
asse1is that there is something that satisfies the predicate in question.
Another, perhaps more problematic, objection that Jubian raises against Quine 's
c1iterion for ontological commitment is that Quine, in fonnulating his criterion, explicitly
employs phrases like "must be the value of the bound variables." Prima facie, the te1m
' must' seems to cany modal connotations and therefore statements containing the term
' must' generate intensional contexts. Jubian is conect that Quine' s use of such phrases in
formul ating his criterion is lmfortunate because it suggests a modal interpretation of
Quine 's. Because Quine rejects intensional contexts, his employment of seemingly modal
connotations in fmmulating his criterion poses a serious problem. However, I now argue
for a reinterpretation of Quine's criterion that employs no modal tenninology and is
adequate for determining the ontological commitments of any themy, therefore
vindicating Quine 's c1iterion of ontological commitment against Jubian's objections.
Critical to an adequate extensional ciitetion of ontological commitment is a
careful distinction between meta-language and object-language. A meta-language is a
language that we use to talk about an object-language. For example, ordina1y English is
the meta-language used to talk about first-order predicate logic. Because a critetion of
ontological commitment is a meta-theoretic ciiteiion that applies to themies in order to
detetmine what those theories say exist, I will first describe a simple obj ect-language
themy to use as a. test case for my criterion of ontological commitment . As noted earlier,
Jubian concedes that there are no intensional problems for detennining the ontological
conunitments of theories that are committed to objects that actually exist. I will pmposely
stipulate a false themy as my test case because it is false theories that Jubian claims
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require intensional notions and so it is false theories that raise problems for an
extensionalist criterion of ontological commitment. Given that a criterion of ontological
commitment should not presuppose whether a theory is conect, it should be able to
dete1mine the ontological commitments of false theories v.rithout incorporating
intensionality. I will demonstrate that my criterion adequately dete1mines the ontological
commitments of my example object-language theory without requiring modal or
intensional notions.
I will take as my test case object-language themy a fo1mal theory that contains a
single statement asse1ti.ng the existence of Pegasus. Following Quine, I eliminate the
ordinary proper name 'Pegasus' in favor of a definite descriptive predicate the uniquely
picks out Pegasus, if Pegasus exists, i.e., 'The x that pegasizes'. Again, this simply
eliminates any ambiguity regarding issues of reference for ordinary proper names. In
first-order predicate logic we have the following object-language fonnaliza.tion of a
statement asse1ting the existence of Pegasus:
(9)

(::Jx) Px

Read, 'There is (exists) an x that pegasizes'. Under Quine's fmmulation, we dete1mine
the ontological commitments of (9) by asking what objects are required to be the value of
the bound variable 'x'. Assigning the actual universe as our domain of discourse, (9)
requires that there be an object in the actual universe that uniquely pegasizes.
When we ask what is required for the truth of (9), we are explicitly working in the
meta-language, i.e. , we are asking about tl1e truth conditions for the object-language
existence asse1tionrnade by (9). Generalized, when we are concemed witl1 dete1mining
the ontological conunitments of a tl1emy we are always asking a meta-theoretic question
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about that the01y. As noted earlier, the problem that Jubian raises against Quine's
formulation is his employment of the ordinary language locution 'must', which is usually
given a modal connotation. I will eliminate any use of modal te1ms like 'must' and 'have
to be' altogether from my meta-language characterization of a criterion of ontological
conunitment, and instead ask: what are the necessmy conditions for the tmth of (9)? In
(10) below, I use boldface to denote meta-theoretic variables ranging over the objectlanguage statement under consideration. I now propose the following criterion of
ontological commitment:
( 10)

(x) (Tis ontologically committed to x, only if - Px

~ -1)

(10) takes the actual universe as its domain of discourse. ' T' denotes a statement in the
object.. language that makes an existence assett ion. In the present case, ' T is a metatheoretic variable ranging over the object-language asse1tion 'there is an x that
pegasizes'. Thus, according toT, there is an object within the extension ofthe defmite
description 'the x that pegasizes' . (1 0) states that it is a necessary condition for the truth
of' T is ontologically conunitted to x' that there is an object in the actual universe within
the extension of the definite description ' the x that pegasizes' . The antecedent, following
the ' only if', states that if there is no object in the actual universe that pegasizes then Tis
false.
The logical f01m of (1 0) is 'p only if q' . 'p ' is the antecedent and ' q is the
1

consequent. (1 0) states that the tmth of 'q is a necessa1y condition for the truth of 'p ' . At
1

this point, one might suspect that I am sneaking in modality by my employment (in the
meta-language) of a ' necessary condition' . However, no modal notions are required to
forma lly explicate a necessary condition for the tmth of a conditional statement. To say
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that 'q' is a necessary condition for 'p' is to say nothing more than if' q ' is not tme, then
'p' is not tJ.ue. Another way of expressing this is that there is no assignment of h1lth-

values to 'p' and 'q', such that 'p' is tJ.ue and 'q' is false. Consider for example, let the
proper name 'Bear' name a dog that actually exists. It is a necessa1y condition that the
statement 'Bear is a mammal ' be tJ.ue in order that the statement 'Bear is a dog' be flue.
Thus, if the statement 'Bear is a dog' is u·ue, there is no assignment oftmth-values such
that ' Bear is a mammal' is false. No modality is required to f01mally explicate the tmth
conditions for statements of the f01m (1 0). Of course, my meta-theoretic account of
ontological commitment does not exclude object-language theories from making modal
assextions, e.g., 'Bear is a dog only if Bear is a mammal' might be interpreted by some as
a claim employing nomological (or "law-like") necessity. My concem however is not
with the ontological relation between being a dog and being a mammal, or for that matter
with any pruticular object-language themy, but with a meta-theoretic criterion for
detennining an object language the01y's ontological commitments, and for that, I have
demonstrated that no modality is required.
Now it is only left to demonsu·ate that my f01mulation succeeds where Jubian
finds purely extensional fonnulations of a criterion problematic. As presented above,
Jubian contends that a problem facing an extensional criterion of ontological commitment
is tl1e ability to detennine the ontological commitments of theories which ru·e
ontologically committed to a purp01ted entity and that pmpoxted entity does not exist but
without incorporating intensionality. I again take as my test case a statement asse1ting the
existence of Pegasus, and show that my criterion adequately determines the ontological
commitments of this statement without inco1porating intensionality.
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Under my criterion, we state in the meta-language that ' Tis ontologically
committed to x' is tme, only if, there is a true statement derived :fi:om, '- Px :::J- T '. The
bold face text is meta-theoretic variables ranging over the object language. In the metalanguage (we are talking about 1), this is to say that a true statement of the fonn '- Px :::J
- T ' is a necessary condition for the tmth of' Tis onto logically committed to x' . That

there is a unique object in the domain of discourse, i.e. the universe, that pegasizes, is a
necessru.y condition for a hue statement derived from '(3x) Px', i.e. 'T. Namely 'if it is
not the case that there is an object that pegasizes, then the theory assetting the existence
of Pegasus is false ' adequately captmes the notion that the statement asserting the
existence of Pegasus is ontologically committed to Pegasus. No intensionality is required
to be the value of the bound variable because if the extension of the description 'the x
that pegasizes' is empty, we simply stipulate that the extension of the 'the x that
pegasizes' is the empty set.
I have argued that (10) is a purely extensional criterion of ontological
commitment that is not subject to Jubian's claim that any adequate criterion of
ontological commitJ.nent will employ intensional notions. While it is unfmtunate that
Quine employed locutions such as 'must be' and ' have to be' in his fonnulation of his
criterion of ontological commitment, I have demonstrated that one need not employ such
locutions. My criterion employs no modal or intensional notions and handles the
problematic circumstances of false theories for which Jubian argued could not be
accounted for with ru.1 extensionalist criterion.
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CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION
Philosophers employ a criterion of ontological commitment to determine what
entities a the01y requires in order for that the01y to be tme. While a criterion of
ontological commitment does not tell us what there is, it tells us what a the01y says there
is. W.V.O. Quine developed the most famous ctiterion of ontological conunitment.
According to Quine, a theory is ontologically committed to those entities that are required
as the range of the bound variables of existential quantification.
Quine's criterion has been attacked for presumably not meeting his own
extensionalist standards. In particular, he employs phrases like 'must be ' and 'have to be'
in f01mulating his criterion and these phrases are usually thought to be intensional
locutions. This raises problems given Quine explicit rejection of intensional notions.
I presented the central argument against Quine's ctiteiion, proposed by Michael
Jubian, that any adequate critetion of ontological commitment will employ some
intensional notions. While it is lmfortunate that Quine uses intensional locutions in his
formulation, I argued for an altemative interpretation of Quine 's criterion that is both
adequate as a criterion and employs no modal or intensional notions.
The end result is an extensionalist c1iterion of ontological commitment that can be
methodologically applied to theories in order to determine what is ontologically required
on the prut of those theories . Given that a core question in philosophy concerns what s01ts
of entities there are, and that often it is not cleru· what ontology a the01y might be
committed to, my ref01mulation of Quine 's criterion contributes a significant
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achievement for ontology as a discipline and for the use of the formal resources of fn·storder predicate logic in making the ontology of a theory explicit.
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